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representation and government in the Italian Regions 
(2018-2020)
Davide Vampa
Department of Politics and International Relations, Aston University, Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT
This article focuses on representation and government formation in 
the Italian regions in the electoral cycle from 2018 to 2020. By 
relying on a large number of data collected in the 18 regions and 
2 autonomous provinces that went to the polls in this period, it 
looks at how votes translated into seats and assesses the dispro-
portionality and fragmentation of the newly elected councils. It also 
considers the composition of winning coalitions and how divided 
they are vis-à-vis the opposition. Additionally, this study explores 
some key characteristics of regional representatives such as gender, 
age and political experience, stressing the existence of significant 
variation across regions and parties. In an unprecedented effort to 
provide a comprehensive map of policy-making elites at the sub- 
national level, the analysis also includes members of the regional 
executives (assessori). Overall, while some regions stand out more 
than others, it is not possible to identify a general model of democ-
racy defining Italian sub-national politics.
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When analysing regional elections, much attention is (rightly) devoted to how votes are 
distributed and how these votes translate into victory or defeat for parties and coalitions. 
Fragmentation, disproportionality and specific characteristics of the elected representa-
tives are additional details, which tend to be overshadowed by the overall election 
outcome. Yet in multiparty democracies the formation, decision-making and survival 
of governments depend not only on who gets more votes and seats but also on how these 
seats are assigned among different parties and who occupies them. This article seeks to 
explore these aspects of representative politics in the Italian regions during the electoral 
cycle going from 2018 to 2020. In three years, 18 regions and 2 autonomous provinces 
went to the polls. Only Sicily, which voted in 2017, lies outside this period starting from 
the ‘tsunami’ general election of 2018 (Calossi and Cicchi 2018).
Italian politics has undergone profound transformations over the last decade, in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis and Great Recession (Karremans, Malet, and Morisi 
2019). Its party system, which had already been significantly altered by the political crisis 
of the 1990s, underwent a new process of restructuring. It saw the collapse of a ‘bipolar 
system’, based on the alternation between centre-left and centre-right coalitions, and the 
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emergence of new political dynamics and electoral realignments. Regions were not 
immune to this. The shift in political equilibria at the regional level accelerated in the 
electoral cycle of 2013–2015, which followed the ‘earthquake’ 2013 general election 
(Chiaramonte and De Sio 2014). As highlighted by various studies, regional party politics 
became more fragmented and volatile (Vampa 2015; Bolgherini and Grimaldi 2017).
Building on previous research on Italian sub-national democracy, the aim of this 
article is to understand whether the instability and fracturing of political representation 
detected in the 2013–2015 cycle have persisted or even increased in more recent years. 
Additionally, the analysis seeks to address a question, which has not been fully answered 
by the existing literature: what are the key characteristics of the political personnel that 
have emerged from a decade of significant political change?
This article first provides a general framework, which can be used for the analysis of 
politics at both representative/legislative and executive institutional levels. Then it 
empirically shows that the Italian regional councils elected between 2018 and 2020 
have generally become more fragmented thanks to the rise of local and personal lists. 
The composition of governing coalitions in the Italian regions has also been affected by 
growing fragmentation. This does not necessarily suggest that regional executives have 
become weaker. In fact, the declining role of political parties as territorially integrated 
organizations has resulted in the strengthening and increasing autonomy of regional 
leaders, particularly in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. The second part of the 
article looks at the characteristics of the new representatives and members of the regional 
executives. It shows that there is significant cross-party and cross-regional variation in 
some key variables, such as age, gender and the political experience of the political 
personnel. This reinforces the picture of a regional political system that is too internally 
diverse and divergent – beyond left-right orientations and the traditional north-south 
divide – to be captured by general definitions.
Assessing regional representative democracy after an election: councils, 
governments and political personnel
What happens after an election? Most observers, particularly those addressing broad 
audiences and readerships, often focus on who wins and has the right to form a new 
government. From a zero-sum, ‘winner-takes-it-all’ political perspective, this is certainly the 
most consequential outcome of the vote count. Yet the way votes are converted into seats, 
which, in turn, influences the allocation of executive offices, may evolve over time, not only 
due to actions and reactions of political competitors but also to broader structural changes: 
new electoral systems, changes in political supply, socio-economic transformations. Here it 
would be too ambitious to uncover the causal factors influencing the way sub-national 
representative democracy works. In the case of Italian regions, there is a rich literature on 
how representation and policy making have been affected by changing electoral mechan-
isms since the mid-1990s (Wilson 2015), intra-party dynamics and inter-party political 
competition (Hopkin 2009; Basile 2015), and socio-economic factors (Vassallo 2013).
This contribution has a narrower scope, since it aims to understand:
(1) whether there is an increasing discrepancy (disproportionality) between distribu-
tion of votes and seats in Italian regional councils;
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(2) whether the recent electoral cycle in Italy has led to more political fragmentation;
(3) whether fragmentation has increased more for winning or losing coalitions.
Yet we should not limit our analysis to the time dimension and just consider change 
between the previous election cycle and the current one. Here we also make a cross- 
sectional comparison: can we identify a common pattern across all regions? Do they 
diverge significantly? These are important questions because clear differences across 
regions would indicate the existence of multiple ‘patterns’ of sub-national representative 
democracy in Italy. Any attempt to place them under the same definitional umbrella 
would therefore risk overlooking a complex and heterogeneous reality.
There is a set of indicators that can be used to analyse the three aspects listed above 
(Table 1). In order to assess the way votes are translated into seats and measure the gap 
between the electoral and representative arenas, we can resort to the index of dispro-
portionality developed by Gallagher (1991). Italian regions rely on a mix of proportional 
and majoritarian systems, which, over time, have changed and, to a certain extent, 
diverged. Since 1999, with the reform of article 122 of the Italian constitution, regional 
Presidents have been directly elected in all but two regions: Valle d’Aosta and the 
Autonomous Province of Bolzano (Mariucci 1999; Wilson 2015). Yet, contrary to what 
happens in pure presidential systems, the legislative body (i.e. the regional council) and 
the head of the executive are not elected separately. Each presidential candidate is 
supported by one or more electoral lists. Seats in the council are then allocated among 
these lists based on which presidential candidate obtains a plurality of the vote (Massetti 
2018, 330–331). While directly elected, a regional president can still be removed by a no- 
confidence motion supported by an absolute majority of the councillors, as stated by 
article 126 of the Constitution. Control of the legislature is therefore essential for the 
well-functioning and survival of the executive and a ‘majority’ bonus is assigned to the 
winning coalition to cement its stability. The size of the majority bonus varies across 
regions and also depends on the margin of victory – i.e. a coalition winning a very large 
share of the vote, well above 50%, will be more self-sufficient and, consequently, will be 
allocated only part or none of the extra seats granted by the bonus. It follows that the level 
of disproportionality has varied over time and across regions.
The electoral systems also partly affect the fragmentation of representation in the 
regional councils. Yet other factors, such as the multiplication of political actors, the 
disintegration of traditional parties and a more mobile electorate, may contribute to this. 
The 2013–2015 electoral cycle already marked a critical point in the history of Italian 
regional democracy, with the effective number of parties (ENP) reaching a record point 
Table 1. Assessing representative democracy in Italian regions: a framework.
Characteristic assessed Indicator Type of comparison






Fragmentation of vote 
and representation
Laakso-Taagepera index for effective number of parties, based 




Laakso-Taagepera index for effective number of parties based 
on seat share of governing parties (ENPSM) and of opposition 
parties (ENPSO)
Competitiveness % difference in seats between governing parties and opposition
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(Bolgherini and Grimaldi 2017; Vampa 2015). By using the Laakso and Taagepera (1979) 
index, it is possible to calculate the ENP in the electoral arena (ENPV), which considers 
how vote shares are distributed. Calculations are instead based on seat shares to assess 
fragmentation in regional councils (ENPS). The correlation between the two measures 
tends to be quite strong but it may be weakened by the disproportionality of the electoral 
system.
However, just looking at the fragmentation of the entire party system does not tell us 
the whole story. An aspect that is rarely considered by comparative studies is whether the 
ENP differs between the two main camps of a democratic system: government and 
opposition. Maeda (2010) has adapted the Laakso-Taagepera index to assess the frag-
mentation of opposition parties in order to see how this impacts on the fortunes of 
governing parties. The rationale of the index is the same as that of the general ENP, with 
a score of 1 meaning that the opposition is formed by just one party, 2 meaning that there 
are two opposition parties of exactly the same size, and so on. In this article the same 
index is also applied to the ruling coalition to determine whether it is more or less 
fragmented than its opposition. In an anomalous presidential system like the one existing 
in Italian regions, government formation is still linked to parliamentary dynamics (i.e. 
the composition of regional councils). Therefore, rather than focusing on vote shares, this 
time we only consider how seats are distributed within the government and opposition 
camps (ENPSM; ENPSO). In a two-party system ENPSM and ENPSO would both be 1. If, 
instead, we have a one-party government and an opposition controlled for two thirds by 
a party and one third by another, ENPSM would still be 1 but ENPSO would be 1.8, and 
so on.
Fragmentation of governing and opposition parties can be combined with a measure 
of competitiveness. In studies on government formation, the difference in seats between 
the largest and second-largest parties has been used to assess the advantage of the former 
over the latter (Krook and O’Brien 2012). This simple formula is adapted to multi-party 
democracy in Italian regions. Rather than looking at the largest vs second-largest party, 
here the focus is on the difference in the percentage of the seats held by all parties 
included in a governing coalition and those excluded from it.
The indicators presented above give us a general, macro-level picture of how elections 
are linked to the partisan composition of representative institutions and the process of 
government formation. They do not tell us much about the characteristics of the political 
personnel populating regional institutions in the aftermath of an electoral cycle. The 
most recent, comprehensive description of the profiles of Italian regional councillors 
dates back to 2013 and refers to data available up to 2005 (Cerruto 2013). No study in 
English has provided detailed information on who currently sits in Italian regional 
councils and regional governments. This is surprising given the political turmoil that 
has shaken Italian democracy over the last decade and has reshaped political elites at all 
levels.
This article aims to partially bridge this gap by focusing on councillors and members 
of regional governments (giunte regionali). The following characteristics are considered 
for both sets of policy makers: age, gender, political experience at the regional and local 
levels. The analysis is mostly cross-sectional, looking at differences among regions and 
among political parties/coalitions.1 In the case of members of the executive, an additional 
indicator is considered: whether they have been selected among the pool of elected 
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councillors or, instead, have been directly nominated by the regional President. This 
latter aspect would give us an idea of the level of ‘autonomy’ of regional governments vis- 
à-vis councils. Table 2 summarizes the indicators that will be used for the empirical 
analysis. All data were collected before 31 December 2020 from an official database of the 
Italian Interior Ministry, which provides extensive details of elected officials in munici-
palities, provinces and regions.2 The analysis relies on the profiles of more than 1,000 
policy makers: 817 councillors and 186 regional ministers (assessori) and Presidents. 
Only Sicily is not included in the analysis since it held its last regional elections before the 
period considered here (2018–2020).
Making votes count: regional councils, government and opposition after the 
elections
Before moving to a discussion of the various indicators presented in the previous 
section, we should consider the overall partisan composition of regional councils 
after the 2018–2020 electoral cycle and compare it to the previous one. Figure 1 
summarizes the share of the vote won by the main parties. Figure 2 looks at how it 
translated into seats across all regional councils. It is interesting to see that the 
centre-left Partito Democratico (Democratic Party, PD) experienced the sharpest 
drop in electoral support and was replaced by the right-wing populist Lega 
(League) as the largest party. Yet the general picture is one of increasing fragmenta-
tion, confirming the developments already observed in 2013–2015. Unlike 2010, 
when each of the two largest parties obtained more than 25% of the vote 
(Tronconi 2010), today their combined share remains well below 50%. This is also 
reflected in their share of seats (Figure 2). Again, the PD seems to be the big loser 
and the League the big winner but neither of them obtains more than 25% of the 
seats in regional councils. In 2013–2015, the PD still played the role of dominant 
party in a political context that, outside the centre-left camp, was already highly 
fragmented. Now the party has lost its primacy and this has resulted in an even more 
‘fluid’ political environment. The group ‘other’, including many local lists, remains 
the largest one.
Table 2. Identifying the political personnel of Italian regions (2018–2020).
Type of policy maker Indicators Type of comparison
Regional councillors Age 
Gender 
Previous political experience at the 
regional level (yes/no and number 
of years) 
Previous political experience at the 
local level (yes/no)
Cross-sectional:
● 18 regions and 2 autonomous provinces (Sicily 
excluded)
● Parties: Democratic Party (PD), Five-star Movement 







Previous political experience at the 
regional level (yes/no and number 
of years) 
Previous political experience at the 
local level (yes/no) 
Elected (yes/no)
Cross-sectional:
● 18 regions and 2 autonomous provinces (Sicily 
excluded)
● Coalitions: centre-left; centre-right
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Figures 1 and 2 suggest the existence of some discrepancies between votes and 
seats. In 2013–2015 the PD’s share of seats was 6 percentage points greater than its 
share of the vote, thanks to the party’s victory in most regions (it was defeated only in 
Lombardy, Veneto and Liguria) and the consequently positive effect of majority 
bonuses on its representation. The same occurred on the right in 2018–2020. The 
League won most regional contests as the leading force of centre-right coalitions and, 
consequently, benefitted more from majority bonuses than in 2013–2015. The 
Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five-star Movement, M5s) is consistently underrepre-




























Figure 1. Vote shares of main Italian parties in regional elections: 2013–2015 and 2018–2020 cycles. 




























Figure 2. Shares of seats won by main Italian parties in regional elections: 2013–2015 and 2018–2020 
cycles. Source: see Figure 1.
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Table 3 shows that disproportionality (Gallagher index) remains relatively high across 
the Italian regions. Overall, they are closer to the more disproportional democratic 
systems of Europe, such as France, Greece, Portugal and the UK, than to state-wide 
Italy, which in the 2018 general election only had a disproportionality of 4 – not to 
mention ‘super-proportional systems’ such as the Netherlands, Belgium and the 
Scandinavian countries (Casal Bértoa 2021). Yet in 2018–2020 the discrepancy between 
votes and seats seems to have generally decreased (−1), although this has not occurred 
homogeneously. Thus, for instance, Bolzano, Campania, Friuli-Venezia Giulia (FVG) 
and Veneto are now very close to being purely proportional systems. In the case of 
Bolzano this is due to the absence of a majority bonus in its electoral system. In the case of 
Campania, FVG and Veneto, this is instead due to the fact that their winning coalitions 
captured more than 60% of the vote and majority bonuses were not activated. In other 
regions disproportionality dropped much less significantly. In some cases, it even 
increased, not only because coalitions won by small margins and relied on majority 
bonuses to gain control of the councils but also due to the existence of thresholds, often 
damaging outsiders. Toscana is the most disproportional region. The ‘dominance’ of the 
PD and the left in that region (Vampa 2020) is not only a sign of a surviving political 
subculture (Ramella 2005) but it is also partly ‘constructed’ by the mechanisms of the 
voting system.
While, generally, disproportionality has slightly decreased, fragmentation, measured 
in terms of ENP, has remained at very high levels, both in terms of votes (ENPV) and 
seats (ENPS), as shown in Table 4. On average, we observe an ENPV of 7.1, a slight 
increase compared to the previous round. Looking at democratic nations in Western 
Europe, only highly fragmented systems such as Belgium and the Netherlands score 
higher on this indicator (Casal Bértoa 2021). Clearly, the proliferation of local and 
‘personal’ lists already observed in the previous electoral cycle (Vampa 2015) continues 
Table 3. Disproportionality in Italian regions (Gallagher index).
2018–2020 2013–2015 Difference
Abruzzo 6.1 8.4 −2.3
Aosta 10 5.1 4.9
Basilicata 12.3 5.1 7.2
Bolzano 2.8 3.1 −0.3
Calabria 8.7 9.8 −1.1
Campania 3.9 10.3 −6.4
Emilia-Romagna 8.5 12 −3.5
FVG 3.2 11 −7.8
Lazio 12.2 9.4 2.8
Liguria 4.9 6.9 −2
Lombardy 5.7 8.7 −3
Marche 6.8 12.9 −6.1
Molise 6.5 8.9 −2.4
Piedmont 7.3 11.7 −4.4
Puglia 13.6 7 6.6
Sardinia 5.1 8.2 −3.1
Toscana 16 11.2 4.8
Trento 9.9 6.8 3.1
Umbria 6.4 13.9 −7.5
Veneto 3.7 4 −0.3
Average 7.7 8.7 −1
Source: see Figure 1
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to have an important impact on the dispersion of votes in regional elections. At the same 
time, when focusing on the composition of councils, it is not surprising that the ENPS 
(5.4 on average) is lower than the ENPV. Some smaller parties may have been unable to 
win representation due to thresholds, territorial distribution of votes/constituencies and 
the distorting effects of majority bonuses, which reward some parties, while punishing 
others. Still, we have instances of highly fragmented councils, particularly in the South – 
Campania and Sardinia being the two extreme cases.
Fragmentation may be assessed at the party-system level but also by considering ruling 
parties and opposition parties separately. Here, the application of the Laakso-Taagepera 
index is not limited to parties that are excluded from government (Maeda 2010) but it is 
extended to the political forces forming winning coalitions. In this way, it is possible to 
see whether fragmentation is symmetrically distributed between the two camps and 
whether this varies across regions and over time.
Table 5 provides an overview of the level of ‘pluralism’ within ruling coalitions and 
oppositions in each region. It also shows how the situation has changed compared to the 
previous election cycle. Additionally, the third set of data gives us an idea of how large the 
gap between government and opposition is in terms of percentage of seats (competitive-
ness). Generally, it seems that, while the average advantage of regional majorities over 
oppositions has slightly increased (+2.4%), fragmentation affected the former more than 
it did the latter in the most recent election cycle.
Figure 3 maps the regions based on the two fragmentation measures, and their 
markers are weighted by the size of the difference in seats between governing parties 
and opposition. Two reference lines divide the scatterplot into four quadrants based on 
the average values of fragmentation of the two political camps. Veneto has a particularly 
cohesive majority (more than in the previous cycle), which also faces a relatively unitary 
opposition. Yet the seat gap between majority and opposition is huge: almost 
Table 4. Fragmentation of votes (ENPV) and seats (ENPS) in Italian regions.
ENPv ENPs
2018–2020 2013–2015 Difference 2018–2020 2013–2015 Difference
Abruzzo 6.7 6.6 0.1 5.1 4.9 0.2
Aosta 7.5 8.2 −0.7 4.8 7.1 −2.3
Basilicata 8.8 7.7 1.1 6 6.2 −0.2
Bolzano 4.4 3.8 0.6 4.1 3.5 0.6
Calabria 10.2 8.7 1.5 7.7 5.4 2.3
Campania 12.2 8.4 3.8 10.8 6.3 4.5
Emilia- Romagna 4.2 3.8 0.4 3.2 2.5 0.7
FVG 5.3 6.4 −1.1 4.9 4.4 0.5
Lazio 7.2 5.9 1.3 4.8 4.8 0
Liguria 6.8 5.6 1.2 5.6 5 0.6
Lombardy 5.5 6.8 −1.3 4.4 5.5 −1.1
Marche 6.2 5.1 1.1 4.7 3.2 1.5
Molise 6.9 12.4 −5.5 6.3 8.3 −2
Piedmont 4.6 4.8 −0.2 3.7 3.2 0.5
Puglia 10.7 8.6 2.1 5.6 6.8 −1.2
Sardinia 13.8 9.5 4.3 11.3 6.5 4.8
Toscana 5.1 3.6 1.5 2.6 2.4 0.2
Trento 7.9 8.4 −0.5 4.8 5.9 −1.1
Umbria 4.8 5.4 −0.6 3.9 3.2 0.7
Veneto 3.9 7.4 −3.5 3.4 6.1 −2.7
Average 7.1 6.9 0.2 5.4 5.1 0.3
Source: see Figure 1.
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Table 5. Ruling parties vs opposition: fragmentation and competitiveness.
Region
ENPS Winning coalition ENPS Opposition
% difference in seats 
government – opposition
2018–20 2013–15 Diff. 2018–20 2013–15 Diff. 2018–20 2013–15 Diff.
Abruzzo 2.7 2.5 0.2 2.5 2.7 −0.2 16.2 16.2 0
Aosta 3.6 3.6 0 1.5 3.5 −2 20 2.8 17.2
Basilicata 3.3 3.5 −0.2 2.9 3.3 −0.4 23.8 33.4 −9.6
Bolzano 1.5 1.2 0.3 4.6 4.4 0.2 8.6 8.6 0
Calabria 5 2.9 2.1 2.7 2.7 0 29 29 0
Campania 6.9 3.3 3.6 3.9 3.3 0.6 29.4 21.6 7.8
Em.-Rom. 1.6 1.1 0.5 1.9 2.9 −1 16 28 −12
FVG 2.3 1.7 0.6 3.2 3.9 −0.7 18.2 10.2 8
Lazio 1.7 1.8 −0.1 4.1 3.5 0.6 −2 13.8 −15.8
Liguria 2.9 2.8 0.1 2.9 2.2 0.7 20 3.2 16.8
Lombardy 2.3 3.1 −0.8 2.4 2.4 0 22.6 20 2.6
Marche 3 1.4 1.6 1.8 3.6 −1.8 29 22.6 6.4
Molise 6 4.6 1.4 1.6 4 −2.4 20 23.8 −3.8
Piedmont 1.9 1.6 0.3 2.5 2.8 −0.3 29.4 29.4 0
Puglia 2.2 3.4 −1.2 4.6 3.8 0.8 9.8 17.6 −7.8
Sardinia 6.5 3.3 3.2 4.7 3.6 1.1 20 20 0
Toscana 1.2 1 0.2 2.5 3.7 −1.2 22 22 0
Trento 2.2 3.1 −0.9 3.9 4 −0.1 20 31.4 −11.4
Umbria 1.9 1.4 0.5 2.3 4.6 −2.3 23.8 23.8 0
Veneto 2.5 2.8 −0.3 1.6 4 −2.4 64.8 13.8 51
Average 3.1 2.5 0.6 2.9 3.4 −0.5 22 19.6 2.4
Source: see Figure 1.
 
Figure 3. Locating Italian regions on the map of party fragmentation: government vs opposition. 
Source: see Figure 1.
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65 percentage points. The Venetian executive is virtually invulnerable to any external 
challenge in the legislative process and this partly derives from the popularity of the 
regional President, Luca Zaia. In the last election, Zaia Presidente, his ‘personal list’, was 
almost self-sufficient in the council and the seats of other centre-right parties, including 
the League, contributed to the formation of an ‘oversized’ cabinet (Lijphart 2012, 79–80).
Emilia-Romagna and Toscana are also characterized by homogeneous majorities, 
dominated by the centre-left PD, although their governments are less strong than the 
Venetian one in terms of share of seats controlled in the council. Among the regions 
considered here, Lazio is the only case of ‘minority’ government, with a negative differ-
ence between majority and opposition seats. Yet in this region, a relatively cohesive 
government, again dominated by the PD, faces a much more fragmented opposition. 
This has guaranteed the survival of the executive, thanks to ad hoc, partial agreements 
(Favale and Vitale 2018). It should also be highlighted that the data presented here refer 
to the situation on 31 December 2020. In March 2021, the centre-left coalition ruling 
Lazio established a formal alliance with one opposition party, the M5s, which joined the 
executive (Ghantuz Cubbe 2021). In Puglia and in the Autonomous province of Bolzano, 
majorities enjoy a smaller advantage in terms of seats but they are also less fragmented 
than the opposition. In Bolzano this is due to the strength of the regionalist Südtiroler 
Volkspartei (South Tyrolean People’s Party, SVP), which, despite gradually losing its 
political dominance, still remains by far the largest party of the region (Vampa and 
Scantamburlo 2020).
Molise and Calabria, two southern regions, are ruled by majorities that have 
a considerable advantage over the opposition in terms of seats, although not nearly as 
considerable as the one observed in Veneto. Yet these majorities, both on the right of the 
political spectrum, are much more fragmented than their oppositions. This is mainly due 
to the fact that, while in northern Italy the League has emerged as the clearly dominant 
party of the centre-right coalition, in the South its electoral growth has been accompa-
nied – and, to a certain extent, constrained – by the resilience of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia 
(FI) and the rise of another right-wing populist party, Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy, 
FdI). Valle d’Aosta, a small alpine region with special autonomy, is also clearly in this 
sector of the map. This is mainly an effect of the electoral decline of the Union Valdôtaine 
(Valdostan Union, UV), a regionalist party which used to play a dominant role in 
building government coalitions (Massetti and Sandri 2012; Vampa 2020) but has recently 
suffered various splits.
In Sardinia and Campania both ruling coalition and opposition are more fragmented 
than the average. The impact of unstable and candidate-driven politics – characterized by 
so-called trasformismo – which is typical of most southern Italian regions, is further 
amplified by factors specific to these two contexts. In Sardinia – an island enjoying special 
autonomy – multiple regionalist parties and pro-autonomy (and even pro- 
independence) movements have crowded the whole political spectrum. In Campania, 
the incumbent leader of the executive, Vincenzo De Luca, a member of the PD, relied on 
an electoral strategy that was strongly centred on his personal charisma. Yet, rather than 
a Venetian-style minimalist coalition dominated by a ‘president’s list’, De Luca promoted 
the construction of an alliance between 15 different partners, of which a minority were 
recognizable as nationally relevant political parties. Each list acted instead as a separate 
link between the President and a loose and territorially dispersed system of prominent 
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local leaders channelling votes to the coalition – what is generally defined as local 
notabilato (Floridia 2014). Additionally, De Luca’s centre-left majority confronted 
a divided opposition, with no dominant party on the centre-right (FdI, the League and 
FI obtained a similar number of votes and seats) and a declining, but still electorally 
relevant, M5s.
In sum, once again, it is difficult to identify patterns and trends that invest all Italian 
regions or a clear majority of them. The picture is one of extreme pluralism, which does 
not allow for any meaningful generalization. Electoral systems, despite almost unan-
imously rewarding winning coalitions with majority bonuses, rely on different thresh-
olds and methods of seat allocation. By interacting with the increasingly disconnected 
strategies pursued by regional elites, electoral mechanisms have in turn resulted in 
multiple and highly distinctive patterns of democratic competition, none of which 
seems to stand out as particularly representative of the entire group or a sub-group of 
regions.
Who sits in regional councils and governments?
The question of how many parties and lists get access to representation and contribute to 
government formation is mainly addressed by referring to the data presented above. 
While the latter are relatively easy to gather, much less is known about the identity of 
regional policy makers. Yet, in order to have a comprehensive picture of how democracy 
works at the sub-national level, it is important to identify the key characteristics of the 
political personnel that are selected for public office.
The most recent study about regional political elites in Italy is the one by Cerruto 
(2013), which mainly focuses on the 1990–2005 period and considers key variables 
such as the gender and age of the elected councillors. Interestingly, their average age 
has not changed significantly over the last fifteen years. It was 49 in 2005; it is 48 
today. Therefore, the rise of the M5s, a new, young, anti-establishment political 
movement, does not seem to have led to a ‘rejuvenation’ of representation in 
Italian regions. What has changed, however, is the balance between men and 
women among the elected candidates. As shown in Figure 4, there was a very slow 
increase in the share of women sitting in regional councils until 2005. We do not have 
comprehensive data for 2010 and 2015 but it can be noted that in 2020 this figure 
more than doubled, although it remains well below the share of women in the 
national parliament (36%).3
Yet a look at the individual cases clearly suggests that there are significant differences 
across regions (Table 6). This is far from surprising given the region-specific dynamics 
already highlighted in the previous section. So, for instance, Emilia-Romagna and Veneto 
are the ‘youngest’ and most gender-balanced regions in Italy. Emilia-Romagna, in 
particular, has seen its share of female councillors grow by 32 percentage points since 
2005, reaching 42% of the total. Veneto has also experienced a similar substantial growth. 
Toscana, Lazio, Umbria and Marche, all located in central Italy, also perform better than 
the average on this indicator. In northern Italy, Piedmont is particularly disappointing. 
Unlike most Italian regions, it actually saw a decrease in its share of female councillors 
and, together with Valle d’Aosta, it lags behind its northern Italian neighbours. In the 
South, the picture is also quite negative for women. With the exception of Molise, all 
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southern Italian regions have less than one fifth of their council seats occupied by 
women. Basilicata has even seen a slight decline in their presence. Liguria is the region 
with the oldest political personnel, which is not surprising, given its demographics.4
There is also considerable territorial variation in terms of the political experience of 
regional representatives. Table 7 includes three key indicators: 1) the share of councillors 
that have previous political experience at the regional level; 2) the average length of such 
experience (in years), and 3) the share of councillors that were in local (municipal or 
provincial) government before becoming regional representatives. The last column of the 
table aggregates the standardized scores of these three variables to obtain a general 
measure of councillors’ ‘sub-national political experience’. Emilia-Romagna has the 



















Figure 4. Women elected in regional councils from 1990 to 2020. Source: Cerruto (2013); author’s own 
elaboration based on Anagrafe degli amministratori locali e regionali for 2020.
Table 6. Age and gender of regional councillors (2018–2020).
Region
Average age % female councillors
2020 2005 Difference 2020 2005 Difference
Abruzzo 47 48 −1 19.4 17.5 1.9
Aosta 49 50 −1 11.4 8.6 2.8
Basilicata 49 49 0 9.5 10 −0.5
Bolzano 49 48 1 23.5 20 3.5
Calabria 51 51 0 6.9 4 2.9
Campania 49 49 0 16 8.3 7.7
Emilia-Romagna 46 48 −2 42 10 32
FVG 51 48 3 14.3 13.3 1
Lazio 47 49 −2 31.4 16.9 14.5
Liguria 52 51 1 20 10 10
Lombardy 45 48 −3 22.2 15 7.2
Marche 49 48 1 30 15 15
Molise 47 49 −2 25 6.7 18.3
Piedmont 46 48 −2 13.7 15.9 −2.2
Puglia 49 50 −1 16 2.9 13.1
Sardinia 49 49 0 13.3 9.5 3.8
Toscana 48 50 −2 33.3 24.6 8.7
Trento 47 48 −1 25.7 20 5.7
Umbria 46 48 −2 30 16.7 13.3
Veneto 47 47 0 35.3 10 25.3




























































































































































































































































































































































CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN POLITICS 13
politically experienced. More than half of them have already occupied positions in the 
regional administration and, on average, this experience has lasted 3.6 years. Also, almost 
all of them (88%) have previously held elective positions in local government.
Interestingly, Lombardy has the lowest political-experience score. Looking at the 
specific scores, the region seems to have a particularly low percentage of councillors 
with previous regional experience. Although this region has been uninterruptedly ruled 
by a centre-right coalition for more than 25 years, the relatively recent collapse of 
Berlusconi’s FI and the rise of the League seem to have contributed to a new intake of 
less experienced councillors. Yet, generally, it is difficult to detect clear patterns that can 
be explained by political traditions, alternation in power and the usual north-south 
divide. For instance, in the South, councillors seem to have relatively high scores for 
political experience in Puglia and Calabria. However, while the case of Puglia can be 
explained by the level of political continuity in this region – governed by a centre-left 
coalition since 2005 – the same argument cannot be applied to Calabria, which has 
changed government at every election since 1995.
Moving from regions to parties and groups, several interesting results can be 
observed (Table 8). Councillors elected with the M5s are the youngest. This is not 
particularly surprising, given their very recent and reluctant transition from movement 
to party (Ceccarini and Bordignon 2018). They are also the most gender-balanced 
among the various groups, with more than one third of female elected officials. The PD 
also scores relatively well in terms of gender balance, although its representatives are, 
on average, older. Interestingly, on the right there is a clear difference between the 
League, on the one hand, and FI and FdI, on the other. The former has a sizable share 
of female representatives and is below the overall average age. The other two parties, in 
contrast, are much more male-dominated and older. FI in particular, which has 
experienced significant electoral decline and has been replaced by Matteo Salvini’s 
League as the largest party on the right, seems to rely on a core of old, male politicians. 
They also seem much more experienced than the representatives of the other two right- 
wing parties, as suggested by the political experience score in the last column in Table 
8. The League is particularly weak when we consider councillors’ previous political 
experience at the regional level. In fact it is consistently outperformed by FdI, its 
populist radical-right ally/competitor. The latter, despite its more recent electoral 
breakthrough, relies heavily on post-fascist and conservative political traditions, 
which have never completely disappeared, particularly in southern Italy, and are still 
sources of recruitment for political personnel.
The PD is the most ‘experienced’ among the groups considered in Table 8. This is 
explained by the fact that this centre-left party has traditionally played a strong role 
particularly in central Italian regions. Of course, things have changed and even 
traditionally ‘red’ regions, such as Umbria and Marche, have moved to the right. 
Yet the PD still seems to retain its leadership in political professionalism at the sub- 
national level. The opposite can be said about the M5s, which has the lowest political 
experience score. However, when considering individual indicators, it is striking that 
44% of M5s councillors – more than the League, FI and FdI – are not totally new to 
the institution, since they have been re-elected. Nevertheless, very few of them 
(15.2%) have a background in local government. Unlike all the other parties, the 
M5s does not seem to promote significant integration between local and regional 
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political careers. This is because Beppe Grillo’s movement actually rejects, at least 
officially, the notion of ‘professional politician’, climbing the territorial ladder of 
public office. Instead, its representatives tend to stick to the level of government of 
their first election. Of course, the M5s is a relatively new and evolving organization 
and future convergence with the other political actors should not be excluded and, in 
fact, is likely to occur.
What is almost completely missing in the literature is a comprehensive description of 
the political class leading the Italian regions. Very little is known about members of 
regional governments (giunte). Table 9 provides a general picture of the key character-
istics of regional presidents and ministers (assessori) aggregated by regions. It emerges 
that they are generally older than councillors but, again, there are some differences 
among regions. Campania has the oldest government, with an average age above 60, 
while Calabria, Sardinia and the Autonomous Province of Bolzano have the youngest 
executives. When considering gender balance, Toscana dominates the ranking, followed 
by two other centre-left regions: Emilia-Romagna and Lazio. Among the regions 






% previous regional 
experience
Average years of 
regional experience




PD 49 28.2 58 3.8 87.3 0.99
M5s 43 35.4 44.3 2.3 15.2 −1.37
League 47 23.2 18 1 82.5 −0.64
FI 50 11.9 38.8 2.9 89.6 0.43
FdI 48 13.3 28.3 2.5 86.7 0.05
Total 48 22.2 37.6 2.6 76.3 –
Source: see Figure 4.





















Abruzzo 48 14.3 14.3 0.7 100 −0.72 0
Aosta 52 12.5 75 4.6 62.5 0.51 0
Basilicata 54 16.7 16.7 1.3 66.7 −1.31 0
Bolzano 47 22.2 55.6 4.4 100 0.94 0
Calabria 53 25 25 2.5 25 −1.84 75
Campania 61 27.3 72.7 4.1 45.5 −0.05 72.7
Emilia- Romagna 50 36.4 45.5 3.1 72.7 −0.19 36.4
FVG 51 27.3 27.3 1.8 90.9 −0.43 54.5
Lazio 48 36.4 54.5 3.6 54.5 −0.31 81.8
Liguria 50 25 87.5 5 50 0.55 25
Lombardy 51 23.5 52.9 3.2 76.5 0.06 52.9
Marche 50 14.3 28.6 1.3 100 −0.31 28.6
Molise 59 0 33.3 4.8 83.3 0.2 16.7
Piedmont 47 25 16.7 0.8 91.7 −0.84 25
Puglia 53 20 60 4 60 0.01 20
Sardinia 47 33.3 33.3 3.3 66.7 −0.52 66.7
Toscana 52 44.4 100 5.6 100 2.08 33.3
Trento 43 25 12.5 0.6 75 −1.36 12.5
Umbria 57 33.3 33.3 4.2 100 0.44 33.3
Veneto 49 33.3 100 9.7 100 3.02 0
Total 51 25.8 48.4 3.4 75.3 – 35.5
Source: see Figure 4.
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governed by the right, Veneto, Umbria and, surprisingly, Sardinia are the ones with the 
most female ministers. Overall, women are still significantly underrepresented but to 
a lesser extent than in regional councils.
Political experience is captured by three sets of variables, whose standardized values 
are combined in an overall score (penultimate column, in Table 9). Veneto’s executive is 
by far the most experienced one. It is followed by Toscana. On the other hand, Calabria 
has the least experienced government. If we intersect governments’ political experience 
with that of the councillors, we obtain a general map of ‘political professionalism’ of 
regional representatives (Figure 5). The regions in the upper-right quadrant are those 
with high levels of political experience at both council and government levels. Veneto, 
Toscana, Bolzano and Valle d’Aosta are in this category. In all these regions, we can 
observe a high degree of political continuity (only recently disrupted in Valle’Aosta) and 
this seems to be accompanied by a resilient political class. The strength and politicization 
of regional identities in Veneto, Bolzano and Valle’Aosta might also have contributed to 
cementing a regionally-focused set of professional politicians. In the opposite quadrant, 
the lower left one, we see regions with less politically experienced personnel. In two cases, 
Basilicata and Trento, the ruling majority has changed for the first time in almost three 
decades with important effects on the composition of both council and executive. This 
has paved the way for the replacement of the old political establishment by a new one. 
Figure 5. Mapping political professionalism in Italian regional administrations (2018–2020). Source: 
see Figure 4.
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Other regions, such as Abruzzo, Piedmont, FVG and Sardinia are classic ‘swing regions’: 
as the ruling majority has changed after every election, they have been characterized by 
high turnover of councillors and regional ministers.
However, it is still difficult to detect clear patterns. While low levels of political 
experience may indicate a lack of professional politicians in regional administrations, 
they do not tell us much about the competence of councillors and, even less so, govern-
ment members. Indeed, the strengthening of regional executives vis-à-vis councils has 
also meant that the former tend to include non-partisan, non-political figures, who are 
directly (and almost exclusively) accountable to the President. These are often ‘experts’, 
who are expected to act in the public interest – rather than follow narrow political 
considerations – thus reflecting a ‘technocratic’ vision of policy making. The last column 
of Table 9 shows that not all members of regional governments are selected from the pool 
of elected councillors. Therefore, strictly speaking, they might not have much political 
experience in regional administration, while still being competent in their assigned area 
of government. In other cases, non-elected members of government may still be partisan 
but have not run as candidates in the regional election. While not necessarily being 
experts, they are still autonomous from the council and remain strongly dependent on 
the support of the President, who has selected them. Generally, a large share of non- 
elected members of the government may be an indicator of looser links between execu-
tive and legislative branches of the regional administration. Lazio and Campania have the 
largest shares of non-elected assessori. Veneto and a number of smaller regions are 
instead representative of a more integrated system, where there seems to be a direct 
line of political promotion from council to government.
The variation in the composition of regional executives depends not only on cross- 
regional differences but may also be driven by the left-right orientation of the ruling 
majorities. Table 10 divides regional government ministers into two categories – centre- 
right and centre-left – and compares them across the indicators considered above. The 
picture is that of older, more gender-balanced and more politically professional centre- 
left assessori. Interestingly, centre-left governments also seem to have larger shares of 
non-elected ministers. This may suggest that PD-led ruling majorities tend to combine 
political professionalism with a certain level of executive autonomy. On the other hand, 
centre-right governments, while being younger and more male-dominated, often consist 
of elected representatives who, however, tend to be quite politically inexperienced (i.e. 
they have only recently been elected).




















Centre-right 50 23.8 40 3.1 80.2 −0.13 31.7
Centre-left 53 30 67 4.1 65 0.27 43.3
Source: see Figure 4.
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Discussion and conclusion
The analysis presented above has considered a wide range of indicators in order to 
provide a comprehensive assessment of the type of representative democracy that 
emerged in Italian regions after the 2018–2020 electoral cycle. The picture is one of 
significant and growing territorial divergence, which seems to reflect marked regional 
idiosyncrasies. Yet, while it is difficult to draw overarching conclusions on how votes 
have translated into seats and governments in the most recent electoral cycle, some 
regions stand out more than others and can be regarded as interesting and clearly 
distinctive cases.
For instance, Veneto, a northern region governed by the right, has bucked the trend of 
increasing party fragmentation, while, at the same time, seeing an increase in the 
proportionality between votes and seats. Its government is among the most cohesive 
ones and relies on a very large legislative majority, mainly produced by the broad political 
consensus built around its successful President. The region is also administered by 
relatively young, gender-balanced and politically experienced personnel both at the 
council and executive levels. Toscana and Emilia-Romagna, traditionally governed by 
the left, are close to this model. Yet, majorities in these two regions are narrower and are 
more reliant on the disproportional effects of the electoral system than in Veneto.
Lombardy, a region that has been continuously ruled by the right and has often been 
regarded as a distinctive model of governance (Vampa 2016), provides a less consistent 
picture than the three cases mentioned above. To be sure, the fragmentation of its 
political landscape and ruling coalition remains at relatively low levels. Yet the region 
lags behind in terms of gender balance and the professionalism of its political personnel.
The two largest regions of the south, Campania and Puglia – despite both being led by 
strong centre-left presidents, who increased their popularity during the coronavirus pan-
demic – have not followed the same trajectory. They diverge in terms of proportionality, 
with the latter being significantly more disproportional than the former. Additionally, 
while the party system of Campania has reached record levels of fragmentation, that of 
Puglia is less crowded than in the previous election cycle. When it comes to the character-
istics of their political personnel, however, the two regions seem to converge. Women are 
underrepresented in both contexts. In terms of the experience of their political personnel, 
they also present a mixed picture, as do most southern Italian regions.
Apart from Bolzano and Valle d’Aosta, which have very peculiar political systems 
dominated by regionalist parties, all the other regions are very difficult to classify. Some 
(Piedmont, FVG, Calabria, Sardinia, Liguria, Molise, Lazio) are ‘swing’ regions, char-
acterized by recurring shifts in the political composition of councils and governments. 
Others (Umbria, Marche, Basilicata, Trento) experienced ‘earthquake’ elections in 2018– 
2020, which ended long periods of centre-left dominance.
The last point that should be made is that the composition of councils is not only 
determined by territorial factors but also by political competition, which, despite the 
proliferation of local and personal lists, is still dominated by state-wide parties. This 
article has therefore provided an assessment of how these parties have differed in terms of 
the characteristics of their elected representatives. Clearly, the PD and, more generally, 
the centre-left camp rely on an older, more politically professional and gender balanced 
political class. On the right, there seems to be a gap between the League, on the one hand, 
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and FI and FdI, on the other. The former, particularly due to its recent electoral 
expansion to the South, relies on a relatively young, female-friendly, less politically 
experienced cohort of elected representatives. FI and FdI display a more traditional 
conservative outlook: older, male-dominated and with a relatively long political experi-
ence in local and regional government. Unsurprisingly, the M5s is the least experienced 
party, mainly due to the fact that its political personnel have entered regional institutions 
without previous involvement in local government.
Overall, sub-national representative democracy in Italy does not seem to have reached 
an equilibrium and is still in flux. What is clear is that Italian regional politics should no 
longer be analysed through the prism of national competition. The 2018–2020 electoral 
cycle has marked a further step in the direction of an increasingly fractured multi-level 
system, in which democratic processes are both vertically and horizontally disconnected. 
This lack of territorial integration is likely to have important implications, which future 
research will no doubt seek to uncover.
Notes
1 For gender, age and political experience, the article also compares current data with those of 
previous electoral cycles provided by Cerruto (2013).
2 Anagrafe degli amministratori locali eregionali, https://dait.interno.gov.it/elezioni/ana 
grafe-amministratori
3 See data provided by the World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL. 
ZS
4 According to the Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT, https://www.istat.it/en/), Liguria 
has the highest share of people aged 65 across all Italian regions.
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